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The	Similarity	Hypothesis	in	Metaethics	
	
	In	the	introduction	to	his	new	book	Being	Realistic	about	Reasons	T.M.	Scanlon	writes:		 “Contemporary	metaethics	differs	in	two	important	ways	from	the	metaethics	of	the	1950’s	and	60’s	and	even	the	later	1970’s	when	John	Mackie	wrote	
Ethics:	Inventing	Right	and	Wrong.	In	that	earlier	period,	discussion	in	metaethics	focused	almost	entirely	on	morality….	Today,	although	morality	is	still	much	discussed,	a	significant	part	of	the	debate	concerns…	reasons	for	action	and	even	more	broadly	reasons	for	belief	and	other	attitudes.”	(2014,	1).		Scanlon	is	capturing	a	thought	that	many	contemporary	metaethicists	would	both	agree	with	as	a	sociological	description	of	their	subject	and	endorse.	We	should	approach	metaethics	with	the	big	picture	in	mind:	a	picture	that	includes	not	just	morality,	but	‘reasons	for	belief	and	other	attitudes’.	Doing	so	is	interesting	in	its	own	right	as	well	as,	potentially,	a	useful	means	of	shedding	light	on	morality	itself.		There	is	a	sense	in	which	this	represents	a	new	‘metanormative’	approach	to,	or	method	in,	metaethics.	But	what	results	has	it	actually	had?	One	interesting	example	is	the	widespread	use	of	what	I	shall	refer	to	as	‘The	Similarity	Hypothesis’.	This	is	the	view	that	practical	normativity	–	what	we	ought	to	do	–	and	theoretical	normativity	–	what	we	ought	to	believe	–	are	similar	in	metaphysically	important	respects.	It	is	a	view	that	is	increasingly	appealed	to	in	arguments	in	metaethics	and	beyond.	The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	assess	the	Similarity	Hypothesis.	I	do	so	by	engaging	with	one	of	the	most	interesting	arguments	against	it.		
	The	paper	proceeds	as	follows.	I’ll	begin	by	saying	a	bit	more	about	the	Similarity	Hypothesis.	I’ll	then	introduce	the	challenge	to	it	that	I’m	interested	in.	The	challenge	concerns	the	contrasting	natures	of	the	‘aims’	of	belief	and	desire	(or	intention)	respectively.	I’ll	briefly	rehearse	and	set	to	one	side	familiar	attempt	to	articulate	this	argument	before	engaging	at	length	with	Stephen	Darwall’s	articulation.	This	will	be	my	main	focus.	I’ll	claim	that	despite	its	promise,	Darwall’s	argument	leaves	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	untroubled.		
1. The	Similarity	Hypothesis	
	According	to	The	Similarity	Hypothesis	theoretical	and	practical	normativity	are,	at	the	metaphysical	level,	the	same	kind	of	thing.	There	are	probably	ways	of	reading	this	claim	on	which	it	is	trivially	true	and	ways	of	reading	it	on	which	it	is	trivially	false.	But	I	intend	something	like	this:		
The	Similarity	Hypothesis:	With	respect	to	the	big	picture	metaphysical	questions	about	their	nature	and	metaphysical	grounds,	theoretical	normativity	and	practical	normativity	look	similar:	for	example,	if	non-natural	realism	is	true	about	one,	then	it’s	true	about	the	other,	if	expressivism	is	true	about	one,	then	it’s	true	about	the	other,	if	one	is	grounded	in	our	attitudes,	or	the	activity	of	reasoning,	then	so	is	the	other.	And	so	on.		This	view	figures	prominently	in	contemporary	metaethics,	sometimes	as	an	assumption	in	arguments,	sometimes	as	defended	premise,	sometimes	as	a	conclusion.			Example	1:	Kearns	and	Star		Consider,	for	example,	Kearns	and	Star’s	recent	defence	of	the	view	that	reasons	
are	evidence		(RA).	The	first	argument	that	they	offer	this	is	the	following	(2009,	pp.219):		
1. Epistemic	and	practical	reasons	are	of	a	kind.	2. RA	provides	the	only	plausible	account	of	reasons	according	to	which	(1)	is	so.	3. Therefore,	RA	is	true	(inference	to	the	best	explanation).		This	argument	clearly	makes	use	of	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	as	a	premise	in	order	to	establish	a	conclusion	about	the	metaphysics	of	theoretical	and	practical	normativity.	(The	Similarity	Hypothesis	is,	of	course,	premise	1).		Example	2:	Parfit		We	find	another	nice	example	in	Derek	Parfit’s	critical	discussion	of	a	view	that	he	calls	‘Metaphysical	Naturalism’.	This	is	the	view	that	normative	facts	are	natural	facts.	Parfit’s	discussion	of	this	view	is	almost	entirely	focused	on	
practical	reasons.	In	concluding	the	section,	however,	Parfit	writes:			 “If	Metaphysical	Naturalism	were	true,	we	could	not	have	reasons	to	have	particular	beliefs.	Such	epistemic	reasons	are	also	irreducibly	normative….	So	it	could	not	be	true	that	we	ought	to	accept	Naturalism,	nor	could	we	have	any	reasons	to	accept	this	view.”	(2011,	pp.110).		What’s	really	going	on	here	is	that	Parfit	is	using	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	to	reject	a	naturalistic	view	practical	reasons.	He	is	effectively	arguing	as	follows:		 1. If	metaphysical	naturalism	is	true	about	practical	reasons,	then	it	is	true	about	epistemic	reasons.	2. If	it	is	true	about	epistemic	reasons,	then	we	would	not	have	any	reason	to	believe	it	to	be	true.	3. So,	metaphysical	naturalism	is	not	true	about	practical	reasons.		We	may	or	may	not	think	that	this	as	a	very	good	argument.	But	that’s	not	what	really	matters	here.	What	really	matters	is	that	it	is	another	instance	in	which	the	
first	premise	-	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	–	is	being	used	to	draw	a	big	picture	metaphysical	conclusion.			Example	3:	Smith		In	the	most	recent	articulation	of	his	view,	Michael	Smith	argues	for	a	particular	view	of	reasons	for	intentional	action;	roughly,	the	view	that	reasons	for	action	are	properly	analysed	as	reasons	for	believing	something	to	be	desirable.	His	argument	is	the	following:		 1. The	concept	of	a	reason	for	belief	is	analyzable	in	non-normative	terms	(i.e.	in	terms	of	probability	and	evidence).	2. So,	if	the	concept	of	a	reason	for	desire	or	action	were	unanalyzable	then	“the	concept	of	a	reason	would	be	a	ragbag”	(2017,	pp.102).	3. The	concept	of	a	reason	is	not	a	ragbag.	4. The	concept	of	a	reason	for	desire	or	action	is	analysable.		This	is	also	an	argument	in	which	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	figures	as	a	premise	–	in	this	case	premise	3.	Smith	is	arguing	from	the	fact	that	the	concept	of	a	reasons	for	belief	and	a	reason	for	intentional	action	are,	in	some	important	sense,	the	same	kind	of	thing,	to	a	conclusion	about	the	metaphysics	of	reasons	for	action	(roughly,	analytical	reductionism).	Although	couched	in	terms	of	the	similarity	of	concepts	(rather	than	properties),	this	is,	I	think,	nevertheless	recognisable	as	an	appeal	to	a	version	of	the	Similarity	Hypothesis.			Example	4:	Cuneo		Finally,	consider	Terence	Cuneo’s	recent	use	of	the	Similarity	Hypothesis.	Cuneo	has	argued	for	the	more	focused	view	that	moral	normativity	and	epistemic	normativity	are,	at	the	metaphysical	level,	the	same	kind	of	thing.	And	he	has	used	this	as	part	of	an	argument	for	moral	realism.	His	‘master	argument’	is	as	follows	(2007,	6):		
1. If	moral	facts	do	not	exist,	then	epistemic	facts	do	not	exist.	2. Epistemic	facts	exist.	3. So,	moral	facts	exist.	4. If	moral	facts	exist,	then	moral	realism	is	true.	5. So,	moral	realism	is	true.		A	version	of	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	figures	here	in	premise	1.	It	would	be	grossly	unfair	on	Cuneo	–	and	others	following	similar	lines	of	argument,	like	Matt	Bedke	Richard	Rowland	–	to	say	that	the	argument	assumes	the	Similarity	Hypothesis.1	Cuneo	(and	others)	argue	for	it	at	length.	Nevertheless,	its	truth	is	a	(the)	key	move	in	their	argument.			These	examples	show	that	the	Similarity	Hypothesis,	in	one	form	or	another,	figures	prominently	in	contemporary	metaethics;	and	there	are	more	examples	out	there.	This	isn’t	surprising.	It	is	a	sensible	hypothesis.	After	all,	both	practical	normativity	and	theoretical	normativity	are	kinds	of	normativity.2	Furthermore,	there	are	some	properties,	like	honesty	or	sincerity,	that	seem	to	straddle	the	border	between	the	theoretical	and	the	practical,	making	a	distinction	in	their	metaphysical	natures	prima	facie	unattractive.3		
2. Fitzpatrick’s	Point			The	Similarity	Hypothesis	can	be	challenged.	I’ll	not	rehearse	all	of	the	challenges	here.	My	aim	is	to	look	in	detail	at	one	interesting	challenge	that	is	occasionally	mentioned	in	the	literature,	but	rarely	(if	ever)	filled	out.	Consider	the	following	remark	from	William	Fitzpatrick,	which	nicely	summarises	the	basic	idea:		 “Suppose…	that	the	existence	of	epistemic	normative	facts	is	tied	to	the	fact	that	belief	has	a	distinct	constitutive	aim:	namely,	truth...	an	ethical	antirealist	might	grant	all	this	while	remaining	sceptical	that	there	is	any	similar																																																									1	Bedke	(2010),	Rowland	(2013).	2	See	e.g.	Stratton-Lake	(2002)	and	Rowland	(2013).	3	This	figures	prominently	in	Cuneo’s	(2007)	argument.	The	metaethical	significance	of	‘entanglement’	is	also	to	the	fore	in	Putnam	(2002).	
analogue	of	a	constitutive	aim	for…	desire	or	intention...”	(Fitzpatrick	2009,	pp.757)	
	I’ll	call	this	Fitzpatrick’s	Point.4	Fitzpatrick’s	point	is	comprised	of	two	claims.	The	first	claim	concerns	the	nature	of	epistemic	normative	facts.	Roughly:	
	 BELIEF:	Belief	has	a	constitutive	aim	-	truth	or	knowledge.	This	explains	or	grounds	the	existence	of	epistemic	normative	facts.		The	second	concerns	the	nature	of	intention	or	desire	and	their	relation	to	the	existence	of	practical	normative	facts.	Roughly:		 NOT	DESIRE:	Desire	or	intention	doesn’t	have	a	constitutive	aim	that	explains	the	existence	of	practical	normative	facts.	
	In	what	follows,	I’ll	discuss	the	case	for	thinking	that	both	of	these	claims	–	and	hence,	Fitzpatrick’s	Point	-	are	simultaneously	true.			Three	brief	clarifications	before	I	begin.	Firstly,	I	will	for	the	most	part	use	the	slightly	clunky	expression	‘desire	or	intention’	throughout.	The	views	that	I’m	discussing	focus	on	one	or	more	of	these	two,	but	there’s	no	great	continuity	in	the	literature.	At	some	points,	for	simplicity,	I’ll	just	talk	about	desire	(and	not	intention)	if	that	is	the	best	fit	with	the	authors	whose	work	I	am	discussing.	Nothing,	I	hope,	turns	on	it.	Secondly,	I	will	focus	–	again,	following	the	authors	with	whom	I	am	concerned	-	on	the	view	that	belief’s	aim	is	truth,	rather	than	knowledge.5	This	too,	I	hope,	is	innocuous	in	the	present	context.		Thirdly	and	most	importantly	the	two	different	arguments	in	defence	of	Fitzpatrick’s	Point	that	I’ll	be	discussing	are	based	on	two	different	readings	of																																																									4	Though	it	is	not	a	point	that	Fitzpatrick	endorses.	He	raises	it	as	a	plausible	source	of	skepticism	about	unified	approaches	to	the	metaphysics	of	theoretical	and	practical	normativity.	5	For	some	discussion	of	whether	the	aim	is	truth	or	knowledge	see	Wedgwood	(2002),	Engel	(2013),	Whiting	(2013).	
‘aim’	–	one	teleological,	one	normative.		On	the	teleological	view	attitudinal	aims	are	understood	in	terms	of	the	intentions	of	those	who	hold	those	attitudes.	On	the	normative	view,	by	contrast,	attitudinal	aims	are	understood	in	terms	of	the	normative	properties	that	(thereby)	govern	those	who	hold	those	attitudes.	I’ll	say	more	about	both	in	due	course.	Importantly	however,	how	we	develop	Fitzpatrick’s	Point	depends	on	which	of	these	two	views	of	‘aim’	we	work	with.	I’ll	begin	by	saying	something	briefly	(in	the	next	two	sections)	about	how	Fitzpatrick’s	Point	can	be	developed	if	we	work	with	the	teleological	view.	But	my	focus	will	really	be	on	whether	we	can	develop	Fitzpatrick’s	Point	if	we	work	with	the	normative	view.		
3. The	Teleological	View		There	is	an	established	literature	that	is	most	closely,	but	not	solely,	associated	with	David	Velleman’s	work	in	the	90’s	and	early	2000’s	that	(a)	employs	the	teleological	view	and	(b)	does	so	in	a	way	that	is	conducive	to	Fitzpatrick’s	Point.6	Much	of	this	will	probably	be	familiar	to	readers,	but	I’ll	sketch	it	in	the	next	two	sections	nonetheless,	before	moving	on	to	the	normative	view.		The	key	points	–	up	front	-	are	the	following.			 (i) Belief	aims,	in	the	teleological	sense,	at	truth.	(ii) Because	of	this,	the	nature	of	belief	grounds	the	existence	and	nature	of	reasons	for	belief.	(iii) You	might	think	that	desire/intention	aims	(in	the	teleological	sense)	at	goodness	or	desirability,	and	so	grounds	the	existence	and	nature	of	practical	reasons….	(iv) …But	you’d	be	wrong.	Desire/intention	doesn’t	aim	at	goodness	or	desirability.	It	aims	as	something	less	interesting	that	can’t	ground	the	existence	of	practical	reasons.																																																										6	Velleman	(1992,	1996,	2000).	The	view	changes	in	Velleman	and	Shah	(2003).	A	similar	view	can	be	found	in	Millar	(2004).	
Putting	these	together	we’re	meant	to	get:		 (v) There’s	good	account	of	the	grounds	of	theoretical	normativity	in	terms	of	the	nature	of	belief,	but	no	analogous	good	account	of	the	grounds	of	practical	normativity	in	terms	of	desire/intention.		And	that	–	i.e.	(v)	-	is	pretty	much	just	the	view	that	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	is	false.	Let’s	take	each	of	these	claims	a	bit	more	slowly	(objections	to	follow).		(i):	For	belief	to	aim	in	the	teleological	sense	at	truth	is	for	one	to	count	as	believing	a	proposition	just	in	case	one	intends	to	accept	it	iff	it	is	true.	There	are	several	reasons	for	thinking	that	this	is	a	good	view.	One	is	that	it	allows	for	an	attractive	differentiation	between	belief	and	other	closely	related	propositional	attitudes	such	as	imagining	or	supposing.	These	are	attitudes	that	plausibly	characterised	as	instances	of	accepting	a	proposition.	But	they	aren’t	beliefs.	And	one	obvious	way	of	thinking	about	what	differentiates	them	from	beliefs	is	that	when	you	imagine	or	suppose	a	proposition	to	be	true,	you	needn’t	be	accepting	it	with	the	intention	of	doing	so	iff	it	is	true.	You	could	be	accepting	it	with	the	intention	of	its	being,	for	example,	useful,	or	interesting	to	do	so.	Not	so	with	belief.	When	you	believe	a	proposition	you	accept	it	with	the	intention	of	doing	so	iff	it	is	true.			(ii):	The	fact	that	belief	has	this	aim	grounds	the	existence	and	nature	of	reasons	for	belief.	Specifically,	it	explains	why	evidence	for	a	proposition	always	constitutes	a	reason	to	believe	that	proposition.	It	does	so	because	believing	on	the	basis	of	what	your	evidence	supports	is	the	best	means	of	satisfying	your	intention;	the	intention	that	you	must	have	insofar	as	you	count	as	believing	a	proposition	at	all.	Reasons	are	generated	in	this	means-ends	way;	they’re	explained	by	being	the	means	to	the	end	of	fulfilling	the	intention	that	is	constitutive	of	believing.			(iii):	Now	it	is	sometimes	claimed	that	much	as	belief	aims	at	truth,	so	desire	or	intention	aims	at	the	good	or	desirable;	a	view	that	is,	for	better	or	worse,	
associated	with	Aristotle	and	more	recently	with	Anscombe	and	Davidson.7	This	view	is	sensible	on	a	first	pass;	it	is	plausible	that	if	you	intend	to	act	in	some	way,	then	you	must	always	take	acting	in	that	way	to	be	good	or	desirable	in	
some	sense.	If	this	were	the	case,	then	you	might	think	that	the	nature	of	desire/intention	could	ground	the	existence	and	nature	of	practical	reasons.	You	would	have	practical	reason	to	take	the	means	to	the	end	of	acting	in	good	or	desirable	ways.	But,	if	the	Velleman-inspired	literature	is	correct	-	you	would	be	wrong	to	think	this.	One	can	desire	or	intend	to	act	in	ways	that	one	doesn’t	–	or	wouldn’t,	on	reflection	–	take	to	be	good	in	any	way.	These	are	perverse	desires	or	intentions,	and	they	are	probably	more	common	than	many	of	us	would	like	to	admit.	They	are	still	desires	or	intentions,	however,	and	we	can	still	perform	full-blooded	actions	on	their	basis.	So	desire/intention	doesn’t	aim	at	the	good	or	desirable.8		(iv):	If	desire/intention	doesn’t	aim	at	the	good	or	desirable,	what	does	it	aim	at?	That’s	contested.	But	the	answer	is	going	to	be	too	bland	to	ground	the	existence	of	practical	reasons.	To	see	this,	note	that	whatever	the	aim	is,	it’s	got	to	be	something	that	all	desires/intentions	have	in	common,	including	desires/intentions	for	what’s	best,	for	what’s	merely	somewhat	good,	and	for	what	isn’t	good	at	all	(i.e.	‘perverse’	cases).	And	whatever	fills	that	role	is	going	to	be	something	fairly	mundane.	Candidates	include:	that	the	resulting	action	have	some	point	or	purpose,	and	that	the	resulting	action	be	under	the	control	of	the	actor.	Now	whilst	any	one	of	these	aims	might	ground	some	practical	reasons	–	for	example,	reasons	not	to	act	in	ways	that	are	unsatisfiable	-	it	is	very	hard	to	see	how	it	could	ground	all	practical	reasons:9		 “Theses	about	the	constitutive	aim	of	intentional	action	are	about	what	is	intrinsic	to	all	intentional	action.	An	action	may	achieve	the	constitutive	aim	while	being	subject	to	criticism	in	all	sorts	of	ways	that	are	not	explicable	just																																																									7	Anscombe	(2000),	Davidson	(1980).	8	Velleman	(Ibid).	9	See	Millar	2004,	Velleman	(Ibid).	This	is	not	uncontroversial.	It	has	been	argued	that	the	nature	–	if	not	the	aim,	exactly	-	of	desire	or	intention	can	ground	practical	reasons	quite	generally,	e.g.	Korsgaard	(2009).	
in	terms	of	the	constitutive	aim.	An	action	may	achieve	the	constitutive	aim	while	being	foolish,	or	morally	wrong,	or	perverse,	or	thoughtless.”	(Millar,	2002,	pp.68).		(v):	Putting	these	points	together,	it	looks	as	though	we	have	a	good	account	of	the	grounds	of	theoretical	normativity	but	no	analogous	good	account	of	the	grounds	of	practical	normativity.	Specifically,	theoretical	normativity	is	grounded	in	the	nature	of	belief,	whereas	practical	normativity	is	not	grounded	in	the	nature	of	desire	or	intention.	It	remains	to	be	seen	how	practical	normativity	is	grounded.	But	we	know	that	the	story	will	have	to	be	very	different	from	the	story	of	how	theoretical	normativity	is	grounded.	This	clearly	threatens	the	Similarity	Hypothesis.				
4. The	Problems	for	the	Teleological	View		This	simple	argument	doesn’t	work	though,	or	at	least	it	doesn’t	obviously	work.	So	a	defender	of	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	needn’t	be	too	worried	by	it.	There	are	problems	with	all	of	(i)-(iv).	But	just	think	about	the	main	problems	with	(i)	and	(ii)	to	start.		As	regards	(i):	It	is	not	at	all	clear	that	the	proposed	account	of	belief	–	as	aiming	at	truth	in	the	teleological	sense	–	is	correct.	There	are	lots	of	reasons	for	this.	One	reason	is	that	only	a	very	small	subset	of	our	beliefs	–	roughly,	those	that	are	a	result	of	conscious	deliberation	-	seem	to	be	accompanied	by	an	intention	of	the	kind	that	the	teleologist	needs.	Ordinary	beliefs	formed	on	the	basis	of	perception,	say,	don’t	seem	to	be	like	this.	Defenders	of	the	teleological	account	have	responded	by	claiming	that	sub-personal	belief-forming	systems	can	in	some	relevant	sense	be	governed	by,	or	overseen	by,	our	intentions	with	respect	to	them,	or	that	these	systems	can	be	ascribed	‘aims’	in	selective	senses.10	But	this	is	an	unhappy	account	in	various	respects.	It’s	a	real	push	to	claim	that	we	have	higher-order	intentions	with	respect	to	our	sub-personal	belief-forming	systems.	And	if	we	make	recourse	to	understanding	the	aims	of	sub-personal																																																									10	Velleman	(2000),	Steglich-Petersen	(2006).	
systems	in	terms	of	their	selective	functions,	then	it’s	hard	to	see	how	these	could	ground	normative	reasons	(as	they	would	need	to	for	BELIEF	to	be	true).11		A	second	problem	is	that	the	teleological	characterisation	of	belief	is	too	strong	in	an	obvious	respect.	The	teleological	account	–	at	least	as	I’ve	presented	it	-	rests	on	the	supposed	datum	that	states	that	are	sensitive	to	our	wishes	as	well	as	our	evidence	are	not	beliefs.	But	this	isn’t	an	obvious	pretheoretical	datum	at	all.	There	are	lots	of	states	that	we	ordinary	call	beliefs	–	albeit	bad	ones	-	that	are	sensitive	to	our	wishes	in	some	way.	Shah	puts	this	nicely:		 “Our	discourse	is	replete	with	accusations	that	likes	and	dislikes	influence	belief...	Recent	debates	about	the	alleged	connections	between	IQ	and	poverty	and	sociobiological	explanations	of	human	sexual	behavior	are	rife	with	such	accusations	on	both	sides,	and	while	individual	charges	of	prejudice	might	be	disputed,	the	legitimacy	of	the	general	form	of	such	criticisms	is	taken	for	granted	by	all	sides.”	(Shah	2003,	pp.16)		Now	it	would	be	possible	to	modify	the	teleological	account	to	take	care	of	this:	in	order	to	count	as	believing	a	proposition	one’s	intention	with	respect	to	it	must	be	merely	somewhat	directed	at	truth.	But	this	modification	runs	into	problems	elsewhere.	It	is	not	longer	obvious	how	we	could	use	the	resulting	account	of	belief	to	differentiate	beliefs	from	closely	related	attitudes	(such	as	imagination	or	supposition)	or	to	explain	the	impossibility	of	believing	at	will.		As	regards	(ii):	On	the	view	discussed	above,	reasons	(for	belief)	are	generated	by	intentions	via	roughly	the	following	principle:	if	"-ing	is	the	best	means	to	Ψ-ing,	and	if	you	intend	to	Ψ,	then	you	have	a	reason	to	".	This	is	a	highly	contestable	principle	however;	one	that	would	require	substantial	further	defence.12		
																																																								11	Papineau	(2013).	12	Enoch	(2011).	
So	where	does	this	leave	us?	It’s	highly	questionable	whether	the	teleological	view	can	establish	BELIEF	and	a	fortiori	highly	questionable	whether	it	could	support	Fitzpatrick’s	Point.			
5. The	Normative	View		The	alternative	normative	reading	of	‘aim’	is	often	thought	to	fare	better	as	an	account	of	the	sense	in	which	belief	aims	at	truth.	The	basic	idea	is	usually	put	like	this:		 NB:	A	belief	is	correct	if	and	only	if	it	is	true.		Correctness	here	is	a	normative	property.	It	denotes	a	normative	standard	for	our	responses	(e.g.	beliefs,	desires,	intentions)	that	holds	just	in	virtue	of	one’s	being	engaged	in	the	kind	of	enterprise	that	one	is	engaged	in.	There	is	some	debate	about	how	exactly	it	should	be	understood	–	whether	in	terms	of	reasons,	oughts,	evaluative	properties	(e.g.	goodness)	or	‘fittingness’.	But	I’ll	bypass	these	issues	here.13		NB	is	an	attractive	way	of	thinking	about	the	sense	in	which	belief	aims	at	truth.		For	one	thing	it	promises	to	avoid	or	resolve	some	of	the	problems	with	the	teleological	reading.	For	example,	NB	is	not	committed	to	the	view	that	we	or	our	sub-personal	systems	must	possess	intentions	with	respect	to	belief-formation.	NB	is	also	not	committed	to	the	troublesome	view	that	beliefs	are	always	influenced	solely	by	truth-related	considerations,	rather	than	by	our	desires.	A	defender	of	NB		can,	however	claim	that	when	our	beliefs	are	formed	on	the	basis	of	our	desires	rather	than	our	evidence,	they’re	not	as	they	ought	to	be.14			
																																																								13	For	discussion	see	e.g.	McHugh	and	Whiting	(2014),	Greenberg	and	Cowie	(2016).	14	Defenders	of	NB	have	also	claimed,	plausibly,	that	their	view	can	explain	a	range	of	further	features	of	belief,	including	transparency	in	deliberation	and	Moore-paradoxical	sentences.	
A	further	attraction	of	NB		is	that	it	is	well	placed	to	explain	the	existence	and	nature	of	epistemic	reasons	for	belief.	For	a	defender	of	NB,	reasons	to	believe	the	truth	and	disbelieve	falsehoods	will	fall	directly	out	of	the	nature	of	belief.	The	mere	fact	that	belief	is	the	kind	of	thing	that	it	is	explains	this.	Reasons	to	believe	what	one’s	evidence	supports	and	disbelieve	evidentially	unsupported	propositions	will	be	explained	as	subsidiary	norms	of	NB;	roughly,	as	norms	that	one	would	follow	in	order	to	conform	to	NB	given	one’s	epistemic	limitations.15			For	these	reasons,	there	is	a	lot	to	be	said	for	the	view	that	BELIEF	is	true	in	virtue	of	NB.	There	are	also,	I	should	add,	serious	objections	to	the	view.	I’ll	return	to	this	in	conclusion.	But	suppose	in	any	case	that	we	do	accept	NB	and,	on	this	basis,	BELIEF	(as	many	seem	to).	My	interest	is	in	whether	this	could	be	the	basis	for	an	argument	for	Fitzpatrick’s	Point.	In	order	to	do	so,	we	would	need	to	see	what	the	normative	view	of	‘aim’	implies	regarding	the	aim	of	desire/intention.			Much	the	most	plausible	and	widely	accepted	view	is	that	it	would	imply	that	the	aim	of	desire	or	intention	is	the	good	or	desirable	after	all.	Or:		 NA:	An	action	(or	intention	or	desire)	is	correct	iff	it	would	be	good	or	desirable.16		This	is	plausible	because,	whilst	it	might	not	be	that	you	do	always	desire	or	intend	the	good	or	desirable,	presumably	you	ought	to.	So	if	we	shift	from	the	teleological	account	of	‘aim’	to	the	normative	‘aim’,	then	it	becomes	plausible	that	the	aim	of	desire	is	goodness	or	desirability	after	all.17																																																										15	For	the	full	case	for	NB	see	e.g.	Wedgwood	(2002,	2007),	Shah	(2003).	For	helpful	discussion	see	Engel	(2013),	McHugh	and	Whiting	(2014),	Greenberg	(2017).	16	See	e.g.	Shah	(2008),	Evans	and	Shah	(2012).	Wedgwood	(2003,	2007)	makes	much	the	same	point	but	puts	it	in	terms	of	‘choice’	and	‘choiceworthiness’.	17	It	is	also	sometimes	argued	that	NA	is	supported	by	a	certain	kind	of	‘transparency’	in	the	nature	of	practical	deliberation	illustrated	by	he	toxin	puzzle	(Shah	2008).	
All	of	this	would	seem	to	undermine	NOT	DESIRE,	and	hence	Fitzpatrick’s	Point.	If	NA	were	true,	then	the	nature	of	intention	or	desire	would	seem	to	have	just	as	good	a	claim	to	ground	practical	reasons	as	the	nature	of	belief	would	to	ground	epistemic	reasons.	You’d	have	practical	reasons	to	act	in	desirable	ways,	much	as	with	NB	you’d	have	reasons	to	believe	the	truth	and	avoid	falsity	(i.e.	epistemic	reasons).		
6. Darwall			Enter	Darwall.18	Darwall	is	happy	to	accept	that	the	aim	of	desire	is	the	good	or	desirable.	But	he	doesn’t	think	that	this	does	any	work	in	grounding	practical	reasons.	And	he	thinks	that	this	marks	a	difference	between	belief	and	desire.	The	aim	of	belief	does	do	some	work.In	other	words,	Darwall	seems	to	provide	the	means	to	defend	Fitzpatrick’s	Point	in	a	way	that	looks	consistent	with	the	normative	reading	of	‘aim’	after	all.		Darwall’s	argument	is	based	on	a	distinction	–	borrowed	from	Velleman	-between	two	very	different	ways	of	specifying	the	aim	of	a	practice.	The	aim	can	be	specified	in	either	formal	or	substantial	terms.	The	distinction	is	best	illustrated	by	example.	There’s	a	fairly	uninformative	sense	in	which	the	aim	of	chess	–	like	many	other	games	and	sports	-	is	to	win.	That	is	its	formal	aim;	winning.	The	substantial	aim	is	what	that	formal	aim	consists	in.	In	the	case	of	chess,	it	is	check-mating	the	opposing	King.	Different	games	will,	of	course,	have	different	substantial	aims.	In	Snap	it	is	to	match	more	pairs	of	similar	cards	than	your	opponent,	in	mixed	martial	arts	it	is	to	incapacitate	your	opponent	by	knockout	or	submission,	and	so	on.		Now	think	about	the	claims	that	belief	is	the	aim	of	truth	and	that	desirability	is	the	aim	of	desire	respectively.	These	are	disanalogous	in	that	the	former	is	about	a	substantial	aim	whereas	the	latter	is	about	a	merely	formal	aim.	The	formal	aim	of	belief	is	presumably	belief-worthiness,	and	the	substantial	aim	of	desire	is	
																																																								18	Darwall	(2003).	
whatever	desirability	consists	in	(which	could	be	any	number	of	things	–	more	on	this	below).	This	disanlogy	is	explicitly	appealed	to	by	Darwall:			 “Owing	to	the	nature	of	belief…	objective	truth	and	probability	bear	on	what	we	have	reason	to	believe…	Still	the	concepts	of	truth	and	objective	probability	differ	from	the	normative	concept	of	what	one	out	to	believe…	whereas	believing	as	we	ought	is	belief’s	“formal	aim”	truth	is	belief’s	“substantive	aim”.		The	situation	is	different	in	the	practical	case…	Evaluative	and	practical	attitudes	do,	like	belief,	have	their	respective	“formal	aims”.	The	formal	aim	of	desire	is	the	desirable…	of	choice,	the	choiceworthy…	But	unlike	belief,	no	evaluative	or	practical	attitude	has	a	“substantive	aim”…	(pp.484)		Furthermore	–	and	this	is	the	crucial	point	–	Darwall	seems	to	take	this	disanalogy	to	be	of	metaphysical	significance.	It	supports	the	view	that	theoretical	reason	and	practical	reason	are,	at	the	big-picture	metaphysical	level,	very	different	things.	Darwall	writes:		It	follows	that,	unlike	theoretical	reason,	practical	reason	is	responsible	to	no	external	goal	or	standard	which	logically	closes	sensible	deliberation.	Reasons	for	acting	can	be	grounded	nowhere	but	within	norms	of	free	practical	reason	itself.”	(pp.484-5).		This	is	a	lot	going	on	here.	But	Darwall	certainly	appears	to	be	presenting	an	argument	for	Fitzpatrick’s	point	–	and	so,	against	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	-	based	on	the	contrast	between	the	substantial	nature	of	belief’s	aim	on	one	hand	and	the	merely	formal	nature	of	desire’s	aim	on	the	other.	But	what,	exactly,	is	the	argument,	what	is	it	meant	to	show,	and	how	plausible	is	it?	The	argument,	as	I	see	it,	is	comprised	of	the	following	core	claims:		
(1) Because	belief	has	a	substantial	constitutive	aim,	theoretical	reason	is	responsible	to	‘an	external	standard	(truth)	that	logically	closes	sensible	deliberation’.		(2) Because	desire	doesn’t	have	a	substantial	constitutive	aim,	practical	reason	is	not	responsible	to	such	a	standard.		 (3) Given	that	–	from	(2)	-	practical	reason	is	not	responsible	to	such	a	standard,	it	must	be	grounded	in	‘the	norms	of	free	practical	reason’.		 (4) By	contrast,	given	that	–	from	(1)	-	theoretical	reason	is	responsible	to	such	a	standard,	it	is	not	grounded	in	‘norms	of	free	theoretical	reason’.		I	hope	that	this	is	an	accurate	rendering	of	Darwall’s	argument.	Given	my	own	aims	in	this	paper,	I	am	interested	to	see	whether	it	could	be	used	to	support	the	further	claims:			 (5) 	From	(3)	and	(4),	the	grounds	of	practical	reason	and	theoretical	reason	are	of	fundamentally	different	kinds.		 (6) So	Fitzpatrick’s	Point	is	right	and	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	is	wrong.		In	the	remainder	of	this	paper	I	will	try	to	find	out	whether	this	is	a	good	argument.	Before	doing	this	it	is	worth	noting	that	–	although	I’ll	focus	on	Darwall’s	argument	-	this	kind	of	argument	isn’t	unique	to	Darwall.	I	think	that	we	find	a	very	similar	thought	in	Hallvard	Lillehammer’s	brief	discussion	of	the	prospects	for	drawing	an	analogy	between	‘epistemology’	and	‘ethics’.	Sceptical	of	this	analogy,	Lillehammer	writes:		 “While	arguments	in	epistemology	often	have	the	pre-theoretical	appearance	of	being	at	least	partly	controlled	by	some	conception	of	an	external	aim	or	function	usually	described	in	terms	of	concepts	such	as	‘truth’	or	‘knowledge’,	
there	does	not	seem	to	be	an	obviously	analogous	aim	or	function	external	to	arguments	in	ethics...	”	(2007,	pp.170).		So	both	Darwall	and	Lillehammer	seem	to	have	–	at	least	–	sympathy	with	the	same	kind	of	reading	of	Fitzpatrick’s	Point	(indeed	Fitzpatrick	makes	his	point	in	the	specific	context	of	noting	the	above	quotation	from	Lillehammer).	It	is,	then,	worth	taking	seriously.	Furthermore	it	is	an	argument	that	I	have	a	lot	of	sympathy	with	on	a	first	reading.	But	does	it	work?	I’ll	argue	that	it	doesn’t.		 7. Assessing	Darwall’s	Argument:	Premise	1			Begin	with:		 (1) Because	belief	has	a	substantial	constitutive	aim,	theoretical	reason	is	responsible	to	‘an	external	standard	(truth)	that	logically	closes	sensible	deliberation’.		This	premise	states	that	theoretical	reasoning	has	an	external	standard,	and	that	it	has	it	in	virtue	of	the	nature	of	belief.	But	what	is	an	‘external	standard’	for	theoretical	reasoning?	This	requires	some	interpretation.	A	good	place	to	begin	is,	I	think,	by	thinking	about	what	an	internal	standard	for	theoretical	reasoning	would	be.	By	a	‘standard’,	I’m	just	going	to	understand	an	aim	or	goal	for	that	practice,	which	in	turn	I’m	going	to	understand	in	normative	terms.	So	the	standard	for	a	practice	is	its	correctness	condition.	‘Internal’	is	harder.	There	is	no	precise,	established	usage	here	so	a	bit	of	interpretation	is	required.	But	I’m	going	to	suggest	that	for	a	standard	to	be	‘internal’	to	theoretical	reasoning	would	be	for	that	standard	to	be,	in	some	important	way,	dependent	on	doing	some	(actual	or	hypothetical)	theoretical	reasoning.	And	there	are	two	obvious	ways	in	which	the	standard	of	theoretical	reasoning	could	be	so	dependent.	One	is	epistemological.	It	is	that	doing	some	theoretical	reasoning	is	necessary	to	
identify	or	work	out	what	the	standard	of	theoretical	reasoning	is.	The	other	reading	is	metaphysical.	It	is	that	something’s	status	as	being	the	standard	of	theoretical	reasoning	is	metaphysically	dependent	on	some	theoretical	
reasoning	that	someone	might	(actually	or	hypothetically)	do.	For	example,	perhaps	being	the	standard	of	theoretical	reasoning	just	is	being	the	view	of	what	you	ought	to	believe	that	you	would	arrive	at	by	thinking	about	what	you	ought	to	do.		So	what	about	an	external	standard,	and	the	claim	that	theoretical	reasoning	is	responsible	to	such	a	standard?	This	can	be	read	in	either	epistemological	or	metaphysical	terms,	mirroring	the	epistemological	and	metaphysical	readings	of	‘internal	standard’	above.	On	the	epistemological	reading,	it’s	that	you	don’t	need	to	do	any	theoretical	reasoning	to	work	out	what	the	standard	of	theoretical	reasoning	is.	On	the	metaphysical	reading,	it’s	that	something’s	status	as	being	the	standard	of	theoretical	reasoning	isn’t	metaphysically	dependent	on	some	theoretical	reasoning	that	someone	might	(actually	or	hypothetically)	do.		So	we	can	interpret	premise	1	in	either	of	the	following	two	ways,	firstly	epistemologically:			 1.2E	Because	belief	has	the	substantial	constitutive	aim	of	truth,	you	don’t	have	to	do	any	theoretical	reasoning	to	work	what	or	identify	what	you	ought	to	believe	(i.e.	truth	and	not	falsehood).		Secondly,	metaphysically:		 1.2M	Because	belief	has	the	substantial	constitutive	aim	of	truth,	the	facts	about	what	you	ought	to	believe	aren’t	such	in	virtue	of	your	doing	any	theoretical	reasoning.		Which	of	these	readings	is	Darwall	going	for?	Which	should	he	go	for?	Either	would	seem	very	plausible.		Begin	with	the	metaphysical	reading.	Unless	a	pragmatist	view	of	truth	–	i.e.	truth	is	acceptability	to	ideal	enquirers	–	is	correct,	then	the	truth	of	propositions	isn’t,	in	general,	metaphysically	dependent	on	one’s	doing	any	theoretical	reasoning.	Darwall	doesn’t	assume	pragmatism	about	truth,	nor	is	it	
obvious	that	he	or	anyone	else	should.	The	idea	behind	the	epistemological	reading	in	contrast	is	that	because	belief	aims	constitutively	at	truth,	working	out	that	a	proposition	is	true	suffices	for	working	out	that	you	ought	to	believe	it.	Given	the	nature	of	belief,	if	you	work	out	that	a	proposition	is	true,	you	don’t	need	to	do	any	further	enquiry	to	work	out	that	you	ought	to	believe	it.			One	reason	to	think	that	Darwall	is	really	going	for	the	epistemological	reading	is	that	it	best	explains	his	additional	claim	about	deliberation.	The	fact	that	belief	aims	at	truth,	he	claims,	‘closes	sensible	deliberation’.	This	is,	to	my	mind,	most	naturally	read	as	supporting	the	epistemological	reading.	To	say	that	the	fact	that	belief	aims	at	truth	‘closes	sensible	deliberation’	is	pretty	much	just	to	say	that	a	sensible	deliberator	will,	on	having	deliberated	and	concluded	that	some	propositions	is	true,	end	her	deliberations	there;	she’ll	believe	that	proposition.	She	won’t	then	go	on	to	ask	“but	should	I	believe	it?”.19		So	the	essence	of	1,	as	I	understand	it,	is	this:	because	belief	aims	at	truth,	when	you’ve	worked	out	that	p	is	true	you	don’t	need	to	do	any	additional	thinking	
																																																								19	There	is	a	slight	complication	here.	This	argument	will	arguably	only	work	if	the	fact	that	belief	aims	constitutively	at	truth	is	part	of,	or	is	entailed	by,	the	
concept	of	belief.	To	see	why	this	is	important,	distinguish	between	two	ways	in	which	belief’s	aim	can	be	constitutive.	Firstly,	its	aim	can	be	constitutive	of	what	it	is	to	believe	something	but	not	constitutive	of	the	concept	of	belief.	When	this	is	the	case,	the	aim	is	metaphysically	constitutive	(think	water	=H2O,	but	for	constitutive	aims).	Secondly,	its	aim	can	be	constitutive	of	both	what	it	is	to	believe	something	and	of	the	concept	of	belief.	When	this	is	the	case,	the	aim	is	
conceptually	constitutive	(think	bachelors	=	unmarried	men,	but	for	constitutive	aims).	The	conceptually	constitutive	reading	would	arguably	be	necessary	if	the	aim	of	belief	is	to	‘close	sensible	deliberation’.	That’s	because	deliberation	won’t	be	sensibly	closed	by	finding	out	that	a	proposition	is	true	unless	the	deliberator	knows	that	a	belief	ought	to	be	true	(and	not	false).	And	whilst	it	is	plausible	to	ascribe	conceptual	competence	to	a	sensible	deliberator	it	isn’t	plausible	to	ascribe	competence	about	the	(metaphysical	and	non-conceptual)	nature	of	things.	I	don’t	think,	though,	that	this	slightly	complication	seriously	undermines	the	basic	case	for	thinking	that	Darwall	is	really	going	for	the	epistemological	reading.	The	point	about	‘closing	deliberation’	suffices	to	establish	that.	Furthermore,	the	most	prominent	and	persuasive	arguments	for	NB	are,	in	fact,	arguments	for	the	conceptually	constitutive	reading	and	not	merely	the	metaphysically	constitutive	reading.	See	McHugh	and	Whiting	(2014).	
about	what	you	ought	to	believe	to	work	out	that	you	ought	to	believe	p.	You	can	just	stop	there.	This	seems	clear	and	plausible.		
8. Assessing	Darwall’s	Argument:	Premise	2	
	With	this	in	mind,	let’s	now	turn	to:		(2)	Because	desire	doesn’t	have	a	substantial	constitutive	aim,	practical	reason	is	not	responsible	to	‘an	external	standard	that	logically	closes	sensible	deliberation’.	
	This	is	structurally	similar	to	(1).	And	much	as	with	(1),	the	main	issue	here	is	that	we	need	to	separate	out	the	metaphysical	and	epistemological	readings.	On	the	metaphysical	reading	this	premise	should	be	read	as	making	a	claim	about	the	nature	of	the	formal	aim	–	desirability	–	itself.	It	should	be	read	as	claiming	that	what	it	is	to	be	desirable	just	is	to	be	the	result	of	some	doing	some	practical	reasoning.	This	view	falls	naturally	within	the	traditional	constructivist	family	of	views	in	metaethics.20	We	can	understand	it	roughly	as	follows:		 2M	Because	desire’s	constitutive	aim	isn’t	substantial,	the	facts	about	what	you	ought	to	do	are	such	in	virtue	of	your	doing	some	practical	reasoning	reasoning.		On	the	epistemological	reading	by	contrast	this	premise	should	be	read	as	making	a	much	more	modest	claim:	a	claim	about	how	we	work	out	or	identify	what	the	substantial	nature	of	the	formal	aim	(desirability)	is.	It	should	be	read	as	claiming	that	in	order	to	work	out	the	substantial	nature	of	desirability,	you	need	to	engage	in	practical	reasoning.	This	is	compatible	with	the	great	majority	of	views	in	traditional	metaethics	–	constructivist,	realist,	and	otherwise.	We	can	understand	it	roughly	as	follows:		
																																																								20	Street	(2010).	
2E	Because	desire’s	constitutive	aim	isn’t	substantial,	you	have	to	do	some	practical	reasoning	to	work	out	or	identify	what	you	ought	to	do.		So	which	of	these	readings	does	Darwall	go	for?	Which	should	he	go	for?	There	are	two	reasons	to	think	that	he	should	go	for	the	weaker,	epistemological	reading.		One	reason	is	that	it	is	a	good	fit	with	the	epistemological	reading	of	(1),	which	,	recall,		explained	Darwall’s	claim	about	‘closing	deliberation’.	Far	more	importantly	however,	Darwall	should	go	with	2E	because	it	is	not	at	all	clear	that	Darwall	would	be	entitled	to	the	stronger	metaphysical	reading,	2M.	He	wouldn’t	be	entitled	to	it	because	the	fact	that	desire’s	constitutive	aim	isn’t	substantial	
simply	doesn’t	entail	that	the	nature	of	desirability	is	metaphysically	dependent	on	the	outcome	of	practical	reasoning.	It	simply	doesn’t	entail,	in	other	words,	the	truth	of	constructivism.	To	see	this,	it	is	useful	to	think	about	traditional	‘realist’	views	in	moral	philosophy.	According	to	these	views	–	unlike	constructivist	views	-	what	one	ought	to	do	is	not	metaphysically	dependent	on	the	result	of	doing	some	practical	reasoning.	Rather	it	is	dependent	on	attitude	or	reasoning	independent	normative	facts.	But	these	realists	could	presumably	quite	happily	accept	that	desirability	is	the	constitutive,	formal	aim	of	desire.	Yet	if	2M	is	right,	then	these	realists	would	thereby	be	displaying	some	kind	of	incoherence.	This	seems	highly	unlikely.	At	the	very	least,	it	would	require	a	lot	more	argument.	Much	more	plausible	is	the	weaker	epistemological	reading,	2E.	On	this	reading,	it	is	necessary	to	do	some	practical	reasoning	to	work	out	what	one	ought	to	do.	This	is	straightforwardly	compatible	with	both	constructivism	and	realism	and	is,	in	fact,	exactly	what	both	of	these	schools	claim.	So	I	think	we	should	certainly	read	2	as	2E.		
9. Assessing	Darwall’s	Argument:	Premise	3	
	With	this	in	mind,	we	can	draw	some	conclusions	about	the	third	premise	of	Darwall’s	argument,	and	indeed	the	nature	of	his	argument	more	generally.	According	to	the	third	premise:	
	 (3) Given	that	–	from	(2)	-	practical	reason	is	not	responsible	to	an	external	standard,	it	must	be	grounded	in	‘the	norms	of	free	practical	reason’.		Is	this	a	metaphysical	claim?	As	a	metaphysical	claim	it	would	be	a	claim	about	the	metaphysical	grounds	of	facts	about	what	one	ought	to	do.	It	would	state	that	the	metaphysical	grounds	of	facts	about	what	one	ought	to	do	is	‘the	norms	of	free	practical	reason’	(obviously,	we’d	need	to	hear	more	about	what	this	is).	Or	is	it	an	epistemological	claim?	As	an	epistemological	claim	it	would	be	a	claim	about	how	to	find	out	what	one	ought	to	do?	It	would	state	that	we	must	do	so	by	using	‘the	norms	of	free	practical	reason’.		To	me	it	sounds	very	much	like	Darwall	is	intending	it	as	a	metaphysical	claim	(perhaps	an	epistemological	claim	too,	but	certainly	a	metaphysical	claim).	It	sounds	like	a	claim	about	the	metaphysical	grounds	of	facts	about	what	one	ought	to	do.	More	specifically,	it	sounds	like	the	claim	that	one	ought	to	do	is	metaphysically	dependent	one	the	outcome	of	one’s	practical	reasoning	on	the	model	of	the	traditional	constructivist	school.	Indeed,	I	think	that	further	features	of	the	paper	(and	Darwall’s	own	work	independently)	speak	to	this	intention.21			Suppose	that	I	am	right	about	this.	It	would	be	a	problem	for	Darwall.	It	would	be	a	problem	because	it	wouldn’t	fit	with	the	conclusions	that	I	drew	about	(2).	In	discussing	(2)	I	argued	that	the	sense	in	which	Darwall	could	feasibly	claim	that	desire	isn’t,	by	its	nature,	responsible	to	an	external	standard	is	an	
epistemological	sense.	It	is	that	we	need	to	engage	in	practical	reasoning	to	find																																																									21	To	see	this	note,	very	briefly,	that	the	conclusion	that	Darwall	goes	on	to	draw	in	the	later	section	of	the	paper	is	that	(some)	practical	reasons,	unlike	theoretical	reasons	are	agent-relative	and	not	merely	agent-neutral.	That	he	draws	this	conclusion	is,	I	think,	an	indicator	that	he	is	reading	(3)	in	the	
metaphysical	sense.	Whether	there	are	any	agent-relative	reasons	-	and	not	merely	how	we	could	know	about	them	if	there	were	any	–	is	clearly	a	metaphysical	and	not	merely	an	epistemological	matter	(I	won’t	detour	to	the	details	of	the	argument	here).	See	also	Darwall	(1992)	for	a	discussion	of	he	kind	of	constructivist	view	that	he	favours.		
out	what	we	ought	to	do.	But	I’m	now	claiming	that	the	conclusion	that	he	is	drawing	in	(3)	is	a	metaphysical	conclusion.	It	is,	effectively,	the	conclusion	that	practical	reasoning	is	metaphysically	grounded	in	‘the	norms	of	free	practical	reason’.	So	it	looks	to	me	as	though	there	has	been	a	slide	from	a	plausible	epistemological	claim,	to	a	much	more	controversial	metaphysical	claim;	a	metaphysical	claim	that,	as	I	argued	in	discussing	(2)	–	isn’t	obviously	supported	by	the	fact	that	the	constitutive	aim	of	desire	is	merely	formal.	So	if	I’ve	read	it	right,	Darwall’s	argument	is	actually	invalid.		
10. A	Preliminary	Conclusion		I	may	or	may	not	have	interpreted	Darwall	correctly	here.	I	hope	that	I	have,	but	in	any	case,	from	the	perspective	of	my	own	interests	in	this	paper,	the	discussion	of	Darwall’s	argument	above	is	highly	significant.		My	own	interest,	recall,	is	with	whether	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	is	true	and	more	specifically	with	whether	Fitzpatrick’s	Point	represents	an	important	challenge	to	it.	The	reason	for	discussing	Darwall’s	argument	is	that	it	looked	like	the	best	shot	at	making	good	on	Fitzpatrick’s	Point.	If	the	argument	succeeded,	then	it	certainly	would	promise	to	do	that.	I	have	argued,	however,	that	Darwall’s	argument	doesn’t	vindicate	Fitzpatrick’s	Point.	In	order	for	it	to	do	so,	Darwall	would	need	to	draw	a	conclusion	about	the	metaphysics	of	practical	normativity	from	premises	that	don’t	license	such	conclusions.	Perhaps,	however,	the	argument	can	still	be	saved.	One	response	would	be	to	argue	that	I	was	too	quick	in	my	discussion	of	(2).	Perhaps	we	can	make	a	case	for	the	metaphysical	reading	of	(2)	after	all.	A	second	response	is	see	if	we	can	use	the	more	modest	epistemological	reading	of	(2)	to	undermine	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	in	another	way.	I’ll	briefly	discuss	each	in	turn.		
11. Reassessing	(2):	Could	it	be	a	Metaphysical	Claim?		I	claimed	above	that	(2)	should	be	read	as	an	epistemological	claim	rather	than	a	metaphysical	claim.	That	was	the	key	to	explaining	why	(3)	must	be	interpreted	
epistemologically	rather	than	metaphysically.	But	perhaps	I	am	wrong	about	this.	Perhaps	(2)	can	be	read	as	a	metaphysical	claim	after	all.	If	it	can,	then	it	will	license	the	metaphysical	reading	of	(3)	and	the	subsequent	argument	against	the	Similarity	Hypothesis.		What	are	the	prospect	for	this.	Recall	the	two	readings.	According	to	the	epistemological	reading:		 1.2E	Because	desire’s	constitutive	aim	isn’t	substantial,	you	have	to	do	some	theoretical	reasoning	to	work	out	or	identify	what	you	ought	to	do.		And	according	to	the	metaphysical	reading:		 2M	Because	desire’s	constitutive	aim	isn’t	substantial,	the	facts	about	what	you	ought	to	do	are	such	in	virtue	of	your	doing	some	practical	reasoning.		Let’s	not	contest	the	epistemological	reading.	Let’s	just	ask	whether	there	might	be	something	more	to	be	said	for	the	metaphysical	reading.	My	argument	against	it	consisted	of	the	following	claims.	Firstly,	the	fact	that	desire’s	constitutive	aim	isn’t	substantial	doesn’t	straightforwardly	entail	that	the	facts	about	what	you	ought	to	do	are	such	in	virtue	of	your	doing	some	practical	reasoning.	Secondly,	there	are	plenty	of	metaethicists	who	would	disagree	with	this	inference	in	any	case;	notably,	realists.	They	may	well	agree	that	desire’s	constitutive	aim	is	merely	formal,	and	yet	not	think	that	the	facts	about	what	you	ought	to	do	are	such	in	virtue	of	your	doing	some	practical	reasoning.		How	might	Darwall	respond?	He	would	need	to	show	that	the	above	mentioned	philosophers	are	mistaken	–	perhaps	they	have	made	an	assumption	that	they	are	not	in	fact	entitled	to.	And	to	show	this	he	would	need	to	support	a	missing	premise	along	the	following	lines:		
(C)	If	the	constitutive	aim	of	a	practice	is	merely	formal,	then	the	substantial	aim	of	that	practice	is	such	in	virtue	of	an	appropriate	application	of	the	norms	of	that	practice.		If	it	were	possible	to	provide	some	general	support	for	this,	then	he	could	hope	to	apply	it	to	the	case	of	desire	and	substantiate	the	metaphysical	reading	of	(2)	and	(3).	I	don’t	have	any	general	argument	against	this	principle.	But	unfortunately,	I	don’t	have	any	positive	argument	for	it	either.	And	the	burden	of	proof	is	presumably	on	someone	who	would	argue	for	it.	I	leave	it	as	a	task	for	another	day	(or	another	philosopher).		
12. An	Epistemological	Threat	to	the	Similarity	Hypothesis?		An	alternative	approach	would	be	to	settle	for	the	epistemological	reading	of	(2)	and	make	do	with	an	epistemological	reading	of	(3)	as	well.	An	epistemological	reading	of	(3)	would	just	state	that	the	way	that	we	work	out	what	we	ought	to	do	is	by	using	the	‘norms	of	free	practical	reason’.	I	take	it	that	this	just	means	that	the	way	that	we	work	out	what	we	ought	to	do	is	by	actually	doing	some	practical	reasoning.	Now	I	noted	above	that	this	would	be	a	disappointment	in	two	respects.	Firstly	it	would	be	a	disappointment	for	Darwall	in	that	it	wouldn’t	capture	his	intentions.	Secondly,	it	would	be	a	disappointment	for	me	in	that	it	would	show	that	my	attempt	to	substantiate	Fitzpatrick’s	Point	by	hijacking	Darwall’s	argument	hasn’t	worked.			I	don’t	want	to	speculate	any	more	on	Darwall’s	intentions.	But	it	is	worth	saying	something	more	about	the	second	disappointment.	As	I	set	it	up,	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	concerns	big	picture	metaphysical	differences	between	theoretical	and	practical	normativity.	And	I	have	argued	that	Darwall’s	argument	isn’t	going	to	undermine	that.	But	it	could	undermine	a	broader	Similarity	Hypothesis	–	a	hypothesis	according	to	which	the	similarity	between	theoretical	normativity	and	practical	normativity	is	either	metaphysical	or	epistemological.	That	is	to	say,	it	could	undermine	the	following	kind	of	view:		
The	Expanded	Similarity	Hypothesis:	With	respect	to	the	big	picture	metaphysical	and	epistemological	questions	about	their	nature,	metaphysical	grounds,	and	the	means	of	our	knowledge	about	them,	theoretical	normativity	and	practical	normativity	look	similar:	for	example,	if	non-natural	realism	is	true	about	one,	then	it’s	true	about	the	other,	if	expressivism	is	true	about	one,	then	it’s	true	about	the	other,	if	one	is	grounded	in	our	attitudes,	then	so	is	the	other,	if	we	know	about	one	in	some	kind	of	way,	then	we	know	about	the	other	
in	the	same	kind	of	way.	And	so	on.		In	fact,	it	is	very	plausible	that	Darwall’s	argument	does	undermine	this	kind	of	view.	To	deny	that	it	does,	one	would	seemingly	have	to	either	deny	that	belief	aims	constitutively	(normatively	interpreted)	at	truth,	or	show	that	desire’s	constitutive	aim	is	not	merely	formal.	And	whilst	one	certainly	could	do	this	there’s	some	kind	of	prima	facie	burden	on	one	who	would	do	so.		The	question,	however,	is	whether	the	Expanded	Similarity	Hypothesis	is	at	all	interesting;	whether	it	is	the	kind	of	view	that	anyone	is	likely	to	hold	or	use	in	an	argument.	This	is	less	clear.	The	examples	that	I	gave	of	the	use	of	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	at	the	beginning	of	this	paper	were	all	metaphysical,	not	epistemological.	So	they	certainly	don’t	seem	to	rely	on	or	argue	for	the	Expanded	Similarity	Hypothesis.	So	perhaps	it	isn’t	terribly	interesting.		Perhaps,	though,	there	would	be	some	mileage	to	be	gained	from	showing	the	Extended	Similarity	Hypothesis	to	be	false.	Firstly,	it	might	be	interesting	just	insofar	as	epistemological	differences	between	theoretical	normativity	and	practical	normativity	are	themselves	interesting.	You	might,	for	example,	be	interested	in	comparing	our	knowledge	of	what	we	ought	to	do	with	our	knowledge	of	what	we	ought	to	believe,	or	in	thinking	about	the	relative	scope	of	disagreement	about	what	we	ought	to	do	and	what	we	ought	to	think.	Consider,	for	example,	Guy	Fletcher’s	suspicion	that:		 “Whilst	cultures	differ	in	what	kinds	of	things	they	take	to	be	evidence,	this	does	not	equate	to	a	body	of	epistemic	norms	that	is	both	internally	coherent	
and	fundamentally	unlike	ours,	in	the	way	that	ethical	norms	appear	to	be.	If	this	is	so	then,	for	whatever	similarities	could	be	found	between	ethics	and	epistemology,	there	is	a	countervailing	dissimilarity	to	be	considered….”	(2009,	pp.368).		Fletcher	doesn’t	provide	evidential	support	for	this	claim,	but	it	is	interesting	to	think	that	it	is	plausible	that	the	disanalogy	that	he	anticipates	would	actually	be	
predicted	by	the	nature	of	the	contrasting	natures	of	the	attitudes	themselves	as	discussed	above.		And	there	is	a	second,	more	ambitious	respect	in	which	the	denial	of	the	Extended	Similarity	Hypothesis	might	be	of	interest.	It	might	be	of	interest	because	the	epistemology	of	the	some	realm	of	the	normative	could	itself	figure	in	an	abductive	argument	about	the	metaphysics	of	that	realm,	as	is	often	the	case	in	‘arguments	form	disagreement’	and	‘arguments	from	epistemic	access’.	It	could	thereby	be	indirectly	relevant	to	assessing	the	Similarity	Hypothesis	itself.	This	kind	of	argument	–	from	epistemology	to	metaphysics	-	is	not	unfamiliar	in	contemporary	metaethics;	think,	for	example,	of	Mackie’s	arguments	from	epistemic	access	and	relativity	to	his	error	theoretic	conclusion,	or	more	recently	of	Sharon	Street’s	argument	from	the	epistemological	problems	for	realists	(really,	a	version	of	the	access	problem)	to	the	truth	of	constructivism.22	But	of	course	establishing	this	would	require	substantial	further	work.23		
13. Conclusion		I’ve	tried	to	give	Darwall’s	argument	–	and	by	extension,	Fitzpatrick’s	Point	–	a	good	run	for	its	money.	Ultimately,	I’m	not	sure	that	we	do	end	up	with	a	reason	for	rejecting	the	Similarity	Hypothesis,	though	I	have	claimed	that	we	might	well	have	a	case	for	rejecting	the	Expanded	Similarity	Hypothesis.																																																											22	Mackie	(1977),	Street	(2006).	23	For	an	unsuccessful	attempt	to	establish	it	in	the	context	of	disagreement	arguments	see	Cowie	(2013).	
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